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Towards	a	political	economy	of	charging	regimes:
fines	and	fees	in	UK	immigration	control
The	extraction	of	revenue	is	an	integral	component	of	UK	immigration	control.
Drawing	on	new	data,	Jon	Burnett	and	Fidelis	Chebe	examine	the	functions	of
charging	regimes	as	a	distinct	form	of	statecraft	that	contributes	to	the	political
economy	of	financial	power,	with	significant	implications	for	understandings	of
criminalisation	and	immigration	enforcement.
In	December	2019,	the	High	Court	ruled	that	the	£1,012	that	children	were	being	charged	to	acquire	British
citizenship	was	unlawful.	With	the	government	making	some	£640	profit	on	each	application,	the	solicitor	for	two	of
the	claimants	condemned	the	charges	as	a	means	of	‘shameless	profiteering’.	What	this	case	did	was	shed	light	on
the	murky	world	of	charging	regimes	that	over	the	last	decade	in	particular	have	become	increasingly	integral	to	the
operation	of	immigration	control,	and	which	are	beginning	to	be	subjected	to	public	scrutiny.
Charging	regimes	and	fines	and	fees	have	a	long	history	in	the	UK,	with	the	1905	Aliens	Act	making	those	who	had
facilitated	the	entry	of	people	who	were	later	deported	potentially	liable	for	a	financial	penalty.	But	whilst	they	have
operated	in	various	guises	for	a	considerable	length	of	time,	there	have	been	significant	attempts	recently	to	both
expand	their	financial	value	in	existing	forms	and	create	new	means	though	which	they	are	enacted.	In	the	process,
they	have	become	vital	components	of	immigration	enforcement,	claims	to	secure	immigration	status,	access	to
justice	and	access	to	services,	with	many	of	these	things	interweaving	with	one	another.
This	is	exactly	what	we	tried	to	investigate	in	our	research,	using	information	from	public	accounts,	annual	reports
and	pre-existing	research,	as	well	as	data	released	through	the	Freedom	of	Information	Act	2000,	with	requests
submitted	in	a	six-month	period	between	October	2018	and	March	2019.	Although	not	all	of	these	FOI	requests
were	successful,	what	this	enabled,	in	the	first	instance,	was	a	very	rough	estimate	of	the	sums	generated	and
levied	for	under	the	rubric	of	immigration	control	in	the	2017-18	financial	year	(albeit	with	caveats),	equating	to	a
sum	of	around	£1.754	billion.
Clearly	this	is	a	not	insubstantial	figure;	and	although	some	components	rely	on	estimates	(such	as	the	NHS
charges	and	fees,	which	were	based	in	part	on	National	Audit	Office	predictions	published	in	2016),	and	other
charges	are	not	included	(such	as	the	Immigration	Skills	charge,	which	it	is	assumed	is	included	under	UKVI	fees),
it	at	the	very	least	provides	an	indication	of	the	kinds	of	revenues	generated	from	(or	levied	for)	people	subject	to
immigration	control.	However,	this	quantitative	data	is	only	one	part	of	a	much	bigger	story:	it	is	a	reflective	of	an
immense	form	of	economic	power	at	the	core	of	immigration	control	which	operates,	we	suggest,	as	a	distinct	form
of	statecraft.
For	instance,	in	line	with	HM	Treasury’s	‘Managing	Public	Money’	guide	advocating	for	certain	government
departments	to	use	charges	to	recoup	costs,	the	Home	Office	has	publicly	committed	to	using	users’	fees	to	fund
front-line	border,	immigration	and	citizenship	operations.	And	if	this	is	indicative	of	is	the	market	rationality	built	into
some	components	of	immigration	control,	it	is	in	practice	underpinned	by	a	desire	for	profitability.	Thus,	fee-
recovery	targets	have	been	set	for	UKVI	applications	which	increased	in	almost	every	year	over	the	last	decade,	to
the	point	that	in	2017-18	they	sought	to	almost	double	the	costs	of	their	administration	(with	a	target	of	194%).
Indeed,	whilst	the	income	to	the	Home	Office	for	UKVI	‘in-country’	applications	was	£17.195	million	deficit	in	2019-
10,	it	had	increased	to	£375.170	million	surplus	in	2017-18,	nine	years	later.
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Among	the	reasons	that	this	is	so	significant	is	that	these	profits	are	procured	selectively,	with	the	Home	Office
suggesting	that	‘the	government	aims	to	limit	fee	increases	on	the	most	economically	beneficially	sensitive	routes	in
order	to	continue	to	attract	those	migrants	and	visitors	whom	add	significant	value	to	the	UK	economy’.	Or	to	put
this	another	way,	they	work	in	such	a	way	that	they	levy	especially	punishing	fees	on	those	migrants	who	are	not
deemed	‘economically	beneficial’,	in	order	(in	part)	to	contribute	to	fees	‘set	at	below	cost’	for	those	who	it	is
deemed	are.	That	is,	they	operate	from	one	perspective	as	an	extension	of	the	managed	migration	policy
framework	enacted	by	New	Labour	in	the	2000s,	and	which	has	been	championed	in	ever-new	ways	by	each
variation	of	Conservative-led	government	since,	that	seeks	to	cherry-pick	migrants	according	to	desirability	and
allocate	rights	accordingly.	At	the	same	time,	charging	regimes	have	intensified	within	the	NHS	(particularly	in
England),	with	regard	to	legal	aid	and	have	become	increasingly	integral	to	immigration	enforcement.	And	in	the
process,	we	argue	that	a	political	economy	of	charging	regimes	has	been	formulated	in	immigration	control	which
manifests	what	sociologists	Vickie	Cooper	and	David	Whyte	have	called	‘institutional	violence’.
It	is	institutional	violence,	for	example,	when	pregnant	women	and	seriously	ill	people	avoid	medical	care	for	fear	of
the	NHS	either	turning	them	away	or	passing	on	their	details	to	the	Home	Office,	acting	as	a	satellite	of	immigration
control.	It	is	institutional	violence	when	people	subject	to	immigration	control	die	having	been	refused	treatment.
And	it	is	institutional	violence	when	people	subject	to	prohibitive	fees	–	designed	cynically	to	extract	profit	from
those	attempting	to	secure	or	regularise	their	immigration	status	–	are	left	vulnerable	to	removal,	denied	access	to
services	and	in	a	quasi-legal	limbo	as	a	result	of	being	unable	to	pay.	Of	course,	there	are	caveats.	There	are	fee-
waivers	in	certain	contexts,	for	certain	charges.	But	in	reality,	these	‘rights’	are	frequently	not	realised.	Rather
people	are	again	and	again	caught	up	in	a	policy	environment	where	charging	regimes	are	at	the	frontline	of	a
blurring	of	immigration	enforcement	with	welfare	delivery,	and	within	which	rights	can	become	conditional	on
capital.
Little	wonder	then	that	there	is	increasing	resistance,	both	external	to	and	from	within	the	spheres	within	which
charging	regimes	have	been	embedded	(such	as	within	the	NHS).	From	across	a	number	of	organisations	and
community	groups,	there	has	been	a	surging	push-back	against	the	inequities	of	charging	regimes	taking	place
both	within	the	courtroom	and	through	avenues	outside	of	it.	These	struggles	have	led	to	certain	citizenship	fees
being	frozen	(or	declared	unlawful),	recognition	by	the	courts	that	right	to	rent	checks	are	discriminatory,	and	have
contributed	to	rendering	the	hostile	(or	‘compliant’)	environment	ideologically	vulnerable	and	in	some	contexts
unworkable.	The	point	here	is	not	to	suggest	that	the	economic	power	that	charging	regimes	exemplify	is	the
driving	force	of	immigration	control,	but	to	recognise	its	role	within	it.	And	despite	being	underpinned	by	claims	of
‘fairness’	and	cost-effectiveness,	charging	regimes	are	in	many	guises	as	cynical	as	they	are	harmful.
_______________
Note:	the	above	draws	on	the	authors’	published	work	in	The	British	Journal	of	Criminology.
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